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FDIC v. RIPPY: Due Care and the Business Judgment
Rule in the Fourth Circuit and the Potential
Implications for the Banking Industry
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the 2009 Recession, the banking industry
experienced a simultaneous culmination of the second-guessing that
accompanies institutional failure and the societal fixation on assigning
legal blame.1 Indeed, it has been said that “the only thing people hate
more than losing money is the person who lost it for them.”2 What the
quote lacks in eloquence and novelty, it more than makes up for in
veracity. From 2009 to 2015, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation3
(“FDIC”) authorized litigation in connection with 150 failed banks
against over 1,200 bank directors and officers (“D&Os”).4 Since the
beginning of 2008, there have been a total of 513 bank failures, meaning
that the FDIC has authorized litigation against nearly 30% of failed
banks.5 While the volume of FDIC lawsuits has recently declined, the
number of cases still being litigated magnifies the importance of how

1. See Matthew C. Klein, Just Who Should We be Blaming Anyway?, THE ECONOMIST
(Jan. 25, 2013, 7:00 PM), http://www.populareconomics.org/economic-crisis-self-blame-thedangerous-underbelly-of-the-american-dream/ (discussing both the desire and failure to
assign blame following the 2009 financial crisis).
2. Author and date unknown.
3. “The [FDIC] preserves and promotes public confidence in the U.S. financial
system . . . by identifying, monitoring and addressing risks to the deposit insurance funds; and
by limiting the effect on the economy and the financial system when a bank or thrift institution
fails.” Who is the FDIC?, FDIC, https://www.fdic.gov/about/learn/symbol/, (last visited Jan.
11, 2016).
4. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY LAWSUITS (last updated Dec. 18,
2015), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls/.
5. Kevin LaCroix, Meanwhile, Back at the FDIC Failed Bank Litigation Ranch, THE
D&O DIARY (July 28, 2015), http://www.dandodiary.com/2015/07/articles/failedbanks/meanwhile-back-at-the-fdic-failed-bank-litigation-ranch/ [hereinafter LaCroix, FDIC
Litigation]. In the same time period, the FDIC has actually filed lawsuits against twenty-one
percent of failed banks. Id. The discrepancy between the number of lawsuits authorized and
lawsuits filed may well be attributable to a “large backlog” of suits that will be filed, but have
not yet been filed. Id. However, not all suits that have been authorized by the FDIC will
ultimately be filed. Id.
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courts are handling such cases.6
In FDIC ex rel. Cooperative Bank v. Rippy,7 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a failed bank’s D&Os
were protected from claims of ordinary negligence by North Carolina’s
business judgment rule (“BJR”).8 Applying its interpretation of North
Carolina’s long-recognized, but infrequently applied, BJR,9 the Fourth
Circuit concluded that the failed bank’s officers were not entitled to its
protection because the FDIC had adduced sufficient evidence to show
that the officers had failed to exercise “due care” in their decisionmaking.10
In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit applied the BJR in
an alarmingly different way than the district court, thereby highlighting
the uncertainty and ambiguity still surrounding proper application of the
rule.11 Consistent adoption of the Fourth Circuit’s application of the BJR
would likely dilute the protection it provides to an extent that would
deprive bank D&Os of any meaningful benefit. The lack of North
Carolina case law explaining the contours of the BJR further amplifies
the persuasive value of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Rippy.12
6. See Kevin LaCroix, Fourth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of All Claims Against Failed
Bank’s Directors, Revives Negligence Claims Against Bank’s Officers, THE D&O DIARY
(Aug, 19, 2015), http://www.dandodiary.com/2015/08/articles/failed-banks/fourth-circuitaffirms-dismissal-of-all-claims-against-failed-banks-directors-revives-negligence-claimsagainst-banks-officers/ [hereinafter LaCroix, Fourth Circuit] (“This appeal ha[s] been very
closely watched and ha[s] attracted a host of amicus briefs in support of the district court’s
opinion.”); FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., supra note 4 (highlighting the plethora of cases either yet
to be filed or currently in the litigation process.
7. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2015).
8. Id. at 313. Although the Fourth Circuit ultimately considered only whether the BJR
protected officers from the FDIC’s ordinary negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims,
this formulation of the question more accurately presents the issue of primary importance.
9. See RUSSELL M. ROBINSON, II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW
§ 14.06, Lexis Advance (database updated Dec. 2015) (“Although the fundamental bases on
which the business judgment rule rests have long been established in North Carolina, the rule
has been specifically mentioned as such in only a handful of North Carolina appellate
decisions.”).
10. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313–14.
11. Compare id. (holding that the BJR’s initial presumption could be rebutted by
evidence suggesting that officers had lacked due care), with FDIC v. Willetts, 48 F. Supp. 3d
844, 849–52 (E.D.N.C. 2014) [hereinafter Willetts II] (holding that the BJR’s initial
presumption could only be rebutted by evidence suggesting grossly negligent conduct). See
also infra Part IV.A.
12. See ROBINSON, supra note 9 (emphasizing the infrequency of explicit application of
the BJR in North Carolina); Salvie v. Med. Ctr. Pharmacy of Concord, Inc., 762 S.E.2d 273
(N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (highlighting that, while North Carolina state courts are not bound by
decisions of federal courts, such decisions may possess substantial persuasive value).
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Accordingly, the implications of the Fourth Circuit’s decision should be
of particular concern to the many banks headquartered in the industry’s
arguably most important state.13
This Note examines the Fourth Circuit’s decision, discusses the
possible effects on the banking industry in North Carolina, and considers
several corollary issues raised by the case. This Note proceeds in five
parts. Part II introduces the statutory and common law provisions
governing D&O liability in North Carolina.14 Part III provides the factual
backdrop of Rippy, what was argued at the district court level, and how
the Fourth Circuit decided the case.15 Part IV critically evaluates the
Fourth Circuit’s decision, discusses its potential effects, and analyzes the
utility of exculpatory provisions in limiting director liability. 16 Part V
concludes by summarizing the major takeaways from Rippy.17
II. BACKGROUND ON STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW PROVISIONS
AFFECTING D&O LIABILITY
A.

Federal Standard of Conduct for Bank D&Os

Federal banking law provides that “[a] director or officer of an
insured depository institution may be held personally liable for monetary
damages in any civil action . . . for gross negligence, including any similar
conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of
care.”18 In Atherton v. F.D.I.C.,19 the Supreme Court interpreted this
language as only setting the floor for bank D&O liability, rather than
categorically barring all ordinary negligence claims.20 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court established that “state law sets the standard of conduct as
long as the state standard . . . is stricter than that of the federal statute.”21

13. See
FDIC,
NORTH
CAROLINA
STATE
PROFILE
(2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/stateprofile/atlanta/nc.pdf (valuing the total assets of
North Carolina banks at greater than $1.9 trillion, by far the highest asset value of any state
in the country).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. Federal Deposit Insurance Act (“FDIA”) § 11(k), 18 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (2012).
19. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 227 (1997).
20. Id. at 216.
21. Id.
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In other words, in states where the standard of care for bank D&Os
exposes them to liability for ordinary negligence, that higher standard is
applied.22
B.

North Carolina’s Standard of Conduct for Bank D&Os

The North Carolina Business Corporation Act (“NCBCA”)
establishes the standard of conduct for bank D&Os in North Carolina.23
Under the NCBCA, D&Os must “discharge [their] duties . . . (1) in good
faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”24 The
adopted statutory provisions effectively codify the three traditional
common law duties of good faith, due care, and loyalty.25
1. Good Faith
The duty of good faith is the most generalized duty of D&Os. 26
While it is expressed as a separate and distinct duty in section 55-830(a)(1) of the North Carolina General Statutes, it is generally understood
to be a component of the duties of due care and loyalty.27 In fact, the
North Carolina Business Court has held that there is no duty of good faith
separate and apart from the duties of due care and loyalty. 28 However,
other courts nationally, particularly in Delaware, have occasionally cited
the duty of good faith as a separate duty that may be breached where
22. Id.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-8-30(a), 55-8-42(a) (2013) (establishing identical standards

of conduct for both directors and officers); see also 4 JOHN M. STRONG, STRONG’S NORTH
CAROLINA INDEX § 459 (Thomas J. Czelusta et al. eds., 4th ed. 1989 & Supp. 2015), Westlaw.
24. § 55-8-30(a), § 55-8-42(a).
25. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 14.01.
26. Id. at § 14.02.
27. Id.
28. State v. Custard, No. 06 CVS 4622, 2010 WL 1035809 (N.C. Super. Mar. 19, 2010)
[hereinafter “Custard II”] (“The North Carolina courts have not created a separate fiduciary
duty of good faith because it is not necessary and would create significant uncertainty under
our law.”). However, in RREF BB Acquisitions, LLC v. MAS Properties, LLC, No. 13 CVS
193, 2015 WL 3646992 (N.C. Super. June 9, 2015), aff’d on reconsideration., No. 13 CVS
193, 2015 WL 7910510 (N.C. Super. Dec. 3, 2015), the North Carolina Business Court
declared that a claim for a breach of duty to negotiate in good faith “may be viable,” thereby
at least tentatively acknowledging the potential existence of a duty of good faith separate and
apart from the duties of due care and loyalty.
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D&Os demonstrate conduct that constitutes: subjective bad faith, an
intentional violation of law, an intentional dereliction of duty, or a
conscious disregard of duty.29
2. Due Care
The duty of due care requires D&Os to use “the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances.”30 Since the implementation of the NCBCA, North
Carolina courts have interpreted the “ordinarily prudent person” language
as establishing a standard of ordinary negligence for D&Os rather than
gross negligence.31 Over time, the “ordinarily prudent person” standard
has evolved to allow for more flexible application dependent on
context.32 Consequently, because banks serve a “quasi-public” function
by holding the public’s funds for safekeeping, what constitutes the
behavior of an “ordinarily prudent person” might be a higher standard in
the context of banking than it would be in normal corporations.33 In any
case, the duty of care imposes an affirmative duty on D&Os to act with
diligence and care in carrying out their respective roles. 34 Doing so
requires “proper care, attention, and circumspection in the affairs of the
corporation”35 and acting on a fully informed basis.36

29. Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business Judgment Rule in
Delaware, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1061, 1071 (2009).
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-8-30(a)(2), 55-8-42(a)(2) (2013).
31. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 14.03.
32. Id.; see also Hauser v. Tate, 85 N.C. 81 (1881) (“To the suggestion that the defendant
did not supervise the operations of the bank and knew nothing of its condition, the answer is
obvious that he voluntarily assumed a position the obligation of which demands this of him,
and persons dealing with the bank may reasonably expect his faithful discharge of that
obligation, and if he bestows no attention on the business, it is his own neglect from which
others should not suffer.”); Townsend v. Williams, 117 N.C. 330 (1895) (“[Directors] are
trustees and liable as such for losses attributable to their bad faith, misconduct or want of care.
They are to direct and supervise the trust confided to them and are not mere figureheads.”).
33. Robert F. Finke et al., FIRREA and Officer and Director Liability, C880 ALI-ABA
613, 639 (1994), Westlaw; see also ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 14.03; Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Gregor, 872 F. Supp. 1140, 1150–51 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that under New York
law, bank directors are held to the higher standard of simple negligence and are not entitled
to the BJR).
34. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 14.03.
35. Anthony v. Jeffress, 172 N.C. 378, 380 (1916).
36. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 14.03.
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3. Loyalty
The duty of loyalty requires D&Os to discharge their duties “[i]n
a manner [they] reasonably believe[] to be in the best interests of the
corporation.”37 The duty of loyalty prohibits D&Os from discharging
their duties in such a way that promotes their own self-interests at the
expense of the corporation or its shareholders.38 Ultimately, the duty of
loyalty is the expectation that D&Os will serve the needs of the
corporation rather than themselves, which also explains why the duty of
loyalty largely comprises the more general duty of good faith.39 Because
these standards of conduct deal more with how an individual performs his
duties rather than the consequences of an individual’s actions, as long as
an individual’s behavior comports with the statutory prescriptions, he or
she generally cannot be held personally liable for damages.40
C.

The Business Judgment Rule in North Carolina

If it cannot be established that a director or officer’s conduct
comported with the fiduciary duties described above, then the subsequent
determination of liability will be evaluated through the lens of the BJR so
long as there is no evidence of bad faith, conflict of interest, or
disloyalty.41 Because of the limited body of North Carolina case law
applying the BJR, North Carolina courts have often relied on the
explanation provided in Robinson on North Carolina Corporation Law:
[The business judgment rule] operates primarily as a rule
of evidence or judicial review and creates, first, an initial
evidentiary presumption that in making a decision, the
directors acted with due care (i.e., on an informed basis)
and in good faith in the honest belief that their action was
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-8-30(a)(3), 55-8-42(a)(3) (2013).
ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 14.04.
Id.
§§ 55-8-30(d), 55-8-42(d).
ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 14.06; see also State v. Custard, No. 06 CVS 4622,
2010 WL 1035809 at *20–21 (N.C. Super. Mar. 19, 2010) (interpreting North Carolina and
Delaware case law to delineate proper application of the BJR); Revised Model Business Corp.
Act Official Comment § 8.30(d), at 224 (1984) (noting that where the statutory standard of
conduct is established, there is no need to apply the BJR, which should only be applied where
evidence suggests that the statutory standard of conduct had not been met).
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in the best interest of the corporation, and second, absent
a rebuttal of this initial presumption, a powerful
substantive presumption that a decision by a loyal and
informed board will not be overturned unless it cannot be
attributed to any rational business purpose.42
In effect, the BJR “protects corporate directors from being
judicially second-guessed when they exercise reasonable care and
business judgment.”43
Because due care is the duty that makes ordinary negligence
actionable, but also is presumptively established by the BJR, an
unremitting tension exists between the two.44 The primary question
presented by Rippy can be phrased in two logically equivalent
alternatives: (1) how strong is the initial presumption established by the
BJR, or (2) what degree of a lack of due care must be shown in order to
rebut the initial presumption?45 As discussed below, how a court answers
this question can have a substantial impact on the potential liability of
bank D&Os.46

42. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 14.06. Furthermore, while the language expressed in
Robinson refers only to “directors,” the scant body of case law applying the BJR in North
Carolina makes it clear that the BJR applies with equal force to officers. See e.g., State ex
rel. Long v. ILA Corp., 132 N.C. App. 587, 601 (1999); Custard II, 2010 WL 1035809 at 21.
Application of the BJR to officers aligns with its underlying purpose of preventing judicial
second-guessing. See infra Part IV.B.i for further discussion of disparate treatment of
directors and officers.
43. Hammonds v. Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., 178 N.C. App. 1, 22 (2006)
(quoting HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, 94 N.C. App. 1, 10, review on additional
issues allowed, 325 N.C. 271 (1989), and modified, aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other
grounds, 328 N.C. 578 (1991)).
44. See Marcia M. McMurray, An Historical Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty
of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 614–17 (1987)
(discussing the interplay between the BJR and the duty of care).
45. See R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging the Business Judgment
Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 1337, 1345–46 (1993) (discussing the initial presumption established by
the BJR and the different interpretations of courts regarding what constitutes sufficient
rebuttal evidence).
46. Id. at 1346–48.
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III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN FDIC EX REL. CO-OP. BANK V.
RIPPY
A.

Factual Background

Cooperative Bank (“Cooperative”) opened in Wilmington, North
Carolina, in 1898, operating as a thrift47 until converting to a statechartered savings bank in 1992.48 As a result of its status as a statecharted bank, Cooperative was subject to regulation by both the FDIC
and the North Carolina Office of the Commissioner of Banks
(“NCCOB”).49 In 2002, Cooperative became a state commercial banking
institution after its board of director’s resolved to increase Cooperative’s
assets from $443 million to $1 billion by the year 2005.50 Pursuant to this
goal, Cooperative emphasized a greater focus on commercial real estate
lending.51
Both the FDIC and NCCOB performed annual reviews of
Cooperative, assigning it “CAMELS scores” on a scale of 1-5 (“1” being
the highest and “5” being the lowest) in six categories: capital, asset
quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. 52
The FDIC’s 2006 review assigned Cooperative a score of “2” in each
category, but noted some deficiencies in Cooperative’s credit
administration and underwriting practices, which the FDIC attributed to
“oversight weaknesses.”53 Cooperative’s management ensured that it
would take measures to correct the deficiencies identified in the FDIC’s
report of examination.54 The NCCOB’s 2007 report of examination
47. A thrift institution is “[a] financial institution that ordinarily possesses the same
depository, credit, financial intermediary, and account transactional functions as a bank, but
that is chiefly organized and primarily operates to promote savings and home mortgage
lending rather than commercial lending.” FED. DEPOSIT INS. CO., MANAGING THE CRISIS, app.
B, at 787 (1998), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history3-b.pdf.
48. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 2015).
49. Id. Although the Fourth Circuit referred to the North Carolina Office of the
Commissioner of Banks as the “NCCB” in its opinion, the prevailing acronym in North
Carolina is “NCCOB,” so that is the form this Note uses. About Us, NCCOB,
http://www.nccob.org/Public/AboutUs/AboutMain.aspx, (last visited Jan. 11, 2016).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 307–08; see generally LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION
OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES, 571–75, (4th ed. 2011) (providing a background
discussion of the CAMELS rating system).
53. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 308.
54. Id.
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issued Cooperative identical “2” ratings in each CAMELS category, but
observed that Cooperative had been slow to address the previously
identified deficiencies.55 Cooperative again made assurances that it
would take steps to correct these issues.56
Also in 2007, Cooperative engaged Credit Risk Management
(“CRM”) to conduct a review of the bank’s lending practices, ultimately
giving the examined loans passing grades while suggesting more frequent
updates of credit file documentation.57 The next year, CRM performed a
second external loan review, this time observing severe shortcomings in
loan documentation and monitoring along with the use of stale financial
information.58 Consequently, many of the examined loans received
failing grades.59
In 2008, the FDIC and NCCOB conducted a joint review of
Cooperative, issuing it the lowest possible rating of “5” in every category
but one.60 The report criticized Cooperative’s high concentration of
commercial real estate loans and management’s inability to correct the
previously identified shortcomings.61 Cooperative closed its doors in
June 2009 after failing to comply with the FDIC’s plan for capital
restoration contained in its cease and desist order, to which Cooperative
had consented.62 The FDIC concluded that as a result of Cooperative’s
failure, the federal deposit insurance fund had suffered $216.1 million in
losses.63
In August 2011, the FDIC filed a complaint against Cooperative,
“alleging that the named officers and directors were negligent, grossly
negligent, and had breached their fiduciary duties in their approval of 78
residential lot loans and 8 commercial loans between January 2007 and
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Somewhat ironically, the one category in which Cooperative did not receive a
“5” was Sensitivity to Market Risk. It received a “4.” Id.
61. Id. at 308–09.
62. The NCCOB also consented, took action to close the bank, and appointed the FDIC
as receiver. Id. at 309. In its capacity as receiver, the FDIC “assumes responsibility for
efficiently recovering the maximum amount possible from the disposition of the
receivership’s assets and the pursuit of the receivership’s claims.” Receivership Management
Program,
FDIC
(last
updated
May
19,
2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/receivership.html.
63. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 309.
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April 2008.”64 The complaint sought damages ranging between $4.4
million and $33 million from each named D&O.65
B.

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Willetts I)

In response to the FDIC’s complaint, the named defendants filed
a motion to dismiss claiming that North Carolina law does not allow
ordinary negligence claims against D&Os, and, regardless, that the BJR
shields D&Os from such claims.66 The defendants argued, alternatively,
that they were protected from liability because they had relied on the
work of other officers and employees as is permitted by North Carolina
law, and that the director defendants were protected from liability
because of the express elimination of liability provided by an exculpatory
clause in Cooperative’s articles of incorporation.67 Lastly, the defendants
argued that the FDIC had presented insufficient facts to support a cause
of action for gross negligence.68
Evaluating these arguments, Judge Terrence Boyle of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina first held that
North Carolina law does not prohibit claims of ordinary negligence
against D&Os.69 As to the protection afforded by the BJR, the district
court observed that, “North Carolina law may recognize director liability
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id.
FDIC v. Willetts, 882 F. Supp. 2d 859, 862 (E.D.N.C. 2012) [hereinafter Willetts I].
Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-8-30(b), 55-8-42(b) expressly provide that:
In discharging his duties a [director or officer] is entitled to rely on information, opinions,
reports, or statements, including financial statements and other financial data, if prepared or
presented by: (1) One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director
reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented; (2) Legal counsel,
public accountants, or other persons as to matters the director reasonably believes are within
their professional or expert competence . . . [unless] he has actual knowledge concerning the
matter in question that makes reliance . . . unwarranted.
68. Willetts I, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 862. Because this Note primarily focuses on the Fourth
Circuit’s application of the BJR, the district court and Fourth Circuit’s treatment of the FDIC’s
gross negligence claims will be addressed only in the footnote text. See infra text
accompanying notes 79, 83, 118.
69. Id. at 863–64. In reaching this conclusion, the district court specifically relied on
North Carolina Corp. Comm. V. Harnett Cnty. Trust Co., 192 N.C. 246 (1926) (holding
“negligent failure of its officers to perform their duties” to be a valid cause of action) and a
comparison of FF Milling Co. v. Sutton, 9 N.C. App. 181,184 (1970) (concluding that
directors may be liable for actions taken in bad faith, but not errors in judgment made in good
faith) and Anthony v. Jeffress, 172 N.C. 278 (1916) (holding directors to a debatably higher
standard because of their duty to maintain knowledge of the corporation’s financial
condition).
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for simple negligence, to the extent that such negligence falls outside the
protection of the business judgment rule.”70 Resolving this primary point
of law, the district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss until
further factual development could be made.71
C.

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Willetts II)

Following a lengthy discovery phase, the defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment on all claims against them.72 The
defendants maintained that their actions were protected by the BJR, and
therefore they could only be held liable for actions constituting gross
negligence.73 In response to this contention, the FDIC asserted that
D&Os are only entitled to protection from the BJR if they “(1) acted in
good faith; (2) employed rational decision-making processes; (3) availed
themselves of ‘all’ materially and ‘reasonably available’ information; and
(4) reasonably believed they were acting in the corporation’s best
interest.”74
Opposing this formulation of the BJR, the defendants contended
that such an understanding is fundamentally incompatible with the
purpose of the BJR, as an individual satisfying the suggested
requirements for its protection could not be liable for negligence, thereby
making any additional protection unnecessary. 75 The defendants further
attacked the FDIC’s understanding of the BJR as erroneously establishing
conduct requirements for its protection instead of establishing an initial
presumption that the D&Os “ ‘acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of
the company.’ ”76 More succinctly, the defendants argued that “[i]t [was
the] FDIC’s burden to overcome the presumption, not defendants’ task to

70. Willetts I, 882 F. Supp. 2d at 864 (internal quotation marks omitted). This question
offers yet another alternative phrasing of the primary issue in the case.
71. Id.
72. Willetts II, 48 F. Supp. 3d 844, 849 (E.D.N.C. 2014).
73. Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Willetts II, 48
F. Supp. 3d 844 (No. 14-02078).
74. Id. At the time this Note was published the FDIC’s brief opposing summary
judgment was under seal by the court and had not yet been released to the public.
75. Id. at 3.
76. Id. at 1–2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Technik v. WinWholesale,
Inc., No. 10-CVS-15709, 2012 WL 160068, at *5 (N.C. Super. Jan. 13, 2012)).
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erect it.”77
In asserting this to be the proper application of the BJR, the
defendants maintained that the FDIC had adduced insufficient evidence
of the grossly negligent conduct necessary for it to overcome its burden,
and that, as a result, only a showing that “there was no rational business
purpose for the challenged 87 loan decisions” could preclude protection
under the BJR.78 In support of this argument, the defendants pointed to
the absence of evidence suggesting that any D&O had acted in “bad
faith,” specifically contending that “[a]s a matter of law, it [would be]
impossible for FDIC to establish gross negligence when its own bank
examiners graded the challenged practices a CAMELS ‘2’ at the same
time they ‘warned’ defendants about ‘weaknesses.’ ”79
After hearing the parties’ arguments, the district court held that
the BJR defeated the FDIC’s negligence and breach of fiduciary duty
claims.80 Discussing the proper application of the BJR, the district court
adopted the North Carolina Business Court’s annunciation of the rule in
Custard, which interpreted the evidentiary presumption expressed in
Robinson as protecting D&Os from personal liability “so long as the court
determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in
a good faith effort to advance the corporate interests.”81 More explicitly,
the district court flat-out declared in reference to the BJR: “This is a gross
negligence standard.”82

77. Id. (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 2–3 (emphasis in original). Defendants proceeded to argue that such a showing

from the FDIC would be impossible on the basis that “one of Cooperative’s principal purposes
was to make loans, so there [could be] no opportunity to claim that any of the 87 loans in [the]
lawsuit lacked a rational business purpose.” Id at 3.
79. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original). The defendants also maintained the additional
arguments proffered at the motion to dismiss stage that Cooperative directors were protected
from personal liability by the exculpatory provision in the bank’s articles of incorporation and
that all the defendants were further shielded from liability because they were entitled to
reasonably rely on other officers and employees in authorizing the questioned loans. Id. at 78. The defendants further argued that they were entitled to summary judgment on the claims
of gross negligence because the FDIC failed to adduce evidence that the defendants’ actions
constituted intentional wrongdoing, as they argued is required for a showing of gross
negligence. Id. at 8–9. This argument was made in response to the FDIC’s contention that
gross negligence requires less than wanton and willful conduct, and that, therefore, an
individual can be liable for gross negligence even where there is no intentional wrongdoing.
Id. at 8.
80. Willetts II, 48 F. Supp. 3d 844, 849 (E.D.N.C. 2014).
81. State v. Custard, No. 06 CVS 4622, 2010 WL 1035809, at *21 (N.C. Super. Mar. 19,
2010) (emphasis in original).
82. Willetts II, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 849–50 (quoting ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 14.06).
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Applying this standard, the district court determined that despite
the “voluminous records, 15 depositions of party, third party, and expert
witnesses including Cooperative’s regulators” the FDIC “fail[ed] to
reveal any evidence that suggests any defendant engaged in self-dealing
or fraud, or that any defendant was engaged in any other unconscionable
conduct that might constitute bad faith.”83 Turning then to whether the
Cooperative D&Os “employed a rational process in making the
challenged loans,” the district court pointed to the multiple satisfactory
reviews of Cooperative’s lending practices in determining that
“defendants’ processes and practices for the challenged loans were
rational and that [the FDIC] . . . failed to rebut the first presumption of
the business judgment rule.”84
Moving to the second presumption that “a decision by a loyal and
informed board will not be overturned by a court unless it cannot be
attributed to any rational business purpose,” the district court held that
“[t]he record simply [could] not support a finding that the defendants’
business purpose fell so far beyond lucid behavior that it could not even
be considered ‘rational.’ ”85 The court emphasized the expectation and
importance of risk-taking, and held that the defendants did not exhibit “a
conscious indifference to risks” that would amount to lacking any rational
business purpose and, accordingly, that “the [BJR] applies even if those
judgments ultimately turned out to be poor.”86
D.

On Appeal to the Fourth Circuit

On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
FDIC argued that the district court had misapplied the BJR and that it had

83. Id. at 850. In noting the absence of evidence supporting self-dealing, fraud, or bad
faith, the district court thus concluded that the FDIC had failed to adduce evidence suggesting
grossly negligent conduct on the part of Cooperative D&Os. Id. Pursuant to this
determination and the district court’s conclusion that gross negligence does indeed require
intentional wrongdoing, the district court awarded summary judgment to all defendants on the
claim of gross negligence. Id. at 851–52.
84. Id. at 850–51.
85. Id. at 851.
86. Id. Notably, because summary judgment was awarded to the defendants on the
ground that their actions were protected by the BJR, the court did not address the defendants’
alternative arguments. See id. at 849–53 (avoiding any mention of the applicability of
Cooperative’s exculpatory provision for its directors and whether the defendants were entitled
to the proclaimed statutory reliance); see also supra text accompanying note 79.
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adduced sufficient evidence to make summary judgment improper.87
1. Foundational Differences in the Parties’ Arguments on Appeal
While largely the same arguments were maintained on appeal, the
respective positions further developed in both parties’ appellate briefs
illustrate some foundational differences in interpretation of the BJR that
warrant discussion.88 An underlying issue regarding proper application
of North Carolina’s BJR is how, if at all, it has been affected by the
NCBCA’s statutory-prescribed standards of conduct for D&Os.89
The defendants argued that the BJR has always shielded D&Os
from claims of ordinary negligence and that the duty of care clause in the
statute did not alter the requirement of a showing of gross negligence to
defeat the BJR’s initial presumption.90 In favor of this position, the
defendants relied heavily on the Court of Appeals opinion in State ex rel.
Long v. ILA Corp.,91 which noted that the adoption of the NCBCA “does
not abrogate the common law of the business judgment rule.”92
Accordingly, the ILA court determined, and the defendants argued, that
“proper analysis” of a director’s decisions “requires examination of
defendant’s actions in light of the statutory protections of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55-8-30(d) . . . and the business judgment rule, either or both of which
could potentially insulate him from liability.”93 Thus, the defendants
argued that proper evaluation of whether the BJR should apply requires
an analysis entirely independent of the prescribed statutory standards of
conduct.94 To this end, the defendants highlighted what they believed to

87. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 2015).
88. See Unsealed Principal Brief for Appellant FDIC-Receiver, Rippy, 799 F.3d 301

(No. 14-02078); Redacted Brief of Appellees, Rippy, 799 F.3d 301 (No. 14-02078).
89. Compare Unsealed Reply Brief for Appellant FDIC-Receiver at 5, Rippy, 799 F.3d
301 (No. 14-02078) (“[W]hen the North Carolina Court of Appeals explained that the statute
did not abrogate the common law, it did not hold, nor could it, that the courts were free after
[Section 55-8-30’s] enactment to craft or extend the common law to contravene the statute.”)
(emphasis in original), with Redacted Brief of Appellees, supra note 88, at 30 (“The [r]ule
continues to apply with full force and effect even after North Carolina’s codification of a
standard of conduct for corporate directors and officers.”).
90. Redacted Brief of Appellees, supra note 88, at 32.
91. State ex rel. Long v. ILA Corp., 132 N.C. App. 587 (1999).
92. Redacted Brief of Appellees, supra note 88, at 43 (quoting ILA Corp., 132 N.C. App.
at 601).
93. ILA Corp., 132 N.C. App. at 601–02.
94. Redacted Brief of Appellees, supra note 88, at 44.
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be a necessary distinction between an “ ‘ordinarily prudent’ standard of
conduct” and a “gross negligence standard of review.”95 Relying on such
an observation by the Delaware Chancery court in a shareholder litigation
suit, the defendants proffered the argument that “[t]he standard of review
is more forgiving of directors and more onerous for . . . plaintiffs” and
that such “divergence is warranted for diverse policy reasons typically
cited as justifications for the business judgment rule.”96
In response, the FDIC argued that the BJR must be applied in a
way that accommodates the NCBCA’s statutory duties.97 Specifically,
the FDIC argued that because the “prudent person” language in section
55-8-30(a)(3) establishes a simple negligence standard, D&Os can be
held liable for ordinary negligence where their actions fail to satisfy the
duty of care element.98 The FDIC contended that, as a result, automatic
invocation of the BJR to preclude liability in all situations where no bad
faith exists effectively lowers the standard of conduct for D&Os from
ordinary negligence to gross negligence.99 As further support for this
argument, the FDIC emphasized the plain language of section 55-8-30(d)
providing that a director or officer will not be subject to liability if “he
perform[s] the duties of his office in compliance with [section 55-830(a)].”100 Thus, the FDIC reasoned that the legislature’s codification of
the duty of care for D&Os would be meaningless if the BJR shielded
D&Os from claims arising from a failure to satisfy that duty.101
2. Exculpatory Provisions Will Protect Directors from Liability for
Ordinary Negligence
Unlike the district court, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis began by
looking at whether Cooperative’s exculpatory provision protected its

95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 45 (quoting In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A. 3d 17, 36 (Del. Ch. 2013));

see infra text accompanying notes 129–47 (discussing the policy arguments surrounding
proper application of the BJR).
97. Unsealed Reply Brief for Appellant FDIC-Receiver, supra note 89, at 4–5.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 8; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a) (2013).
100. Id.
101. See id. (“The legislature’s expression of the ordinary care standard and only one level
of performance to avoid liability show that it did not intend to prescribe a different grossnegligence standard.”).
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directors from liability for ordinary negligence.102 The Fourth Circuit
observed that, in North Carolina, “a corporation may limit personal
liability for a director’s breach of a duty of care so long as the director
did not know or believe his or her actions to have been clearly contrary
to the corporation’s best interests.”103 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
noted that exculpatory provisions only shield directors from liability
caused by ordinary negligence, and that they do not also allow for a
limitation on the duties of loyalty and good faith, or gross negligence.104
Applying this standard, the court therefore considered only
whether Cooperative’s directors had breached their duty of good faith, as
the FDIC had not alleged that they breached their duty of loyalty. 105 In
its analysis, the Fourth Circuit noted, “the duty of good faith requires
[corporate] directors to avoid self-dealing,” and that “making decisions
without adequate information . . . is insufficient.”106 Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit held that, particularly in light of the bank’s positive
CAMELS scores, the FDIC had not presented evidence showing that
Cooperative’s directors “knew or believed [that their acts or omissions]
were clearly in conflict with the [b]ank’s best interests.”107
Consequently, the court affirmed the district court’s award of summary
judgment to Cooperative directors on the FDIC’s claims of ordinary
negligence and breach of fiduciary duties.108
3. The Business Judgment Rule can be Rebutted by a Showing of a
Lack of Due Care
Because the exculpatory provision in Cooperative’s articles of
incorporation protected only directors, the Fourth Circuit examined only
officer liability “through the lens of North Carolina’s business judgment
rule.”109 The court stated that while it agreed with the interpretation of
102. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 312 (4th Cir. 2015). Currently,
under North Carolina law, only directors are entitled to protection by exculpatory provisions,
so Cooperative officers fell outside the scope of this argument. Id.; see infra Part IV.B for
additional discussion of exculpatory provisions.
103. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 311 (emphasis in original).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 312.
106. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Long v. ILA Corp., 132 N.C. App. 587, 597).
107. Id. at 312 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id.
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the BJR posited by the defendants and adopted by the district court, it
disagreed with the district court’s application of the rule.110 Specifically,
whereas the district court held that the BJR’s initial presumption could
only be rebutted by a showing that the defendants’ actions amounted to
gross negligence, the Fourth Circuit asserted that:
Given the structure of the business judgment rule, the
initial presumption [could] be rebutted with evidence
showing that the [officers]: (1) did not avail themselves
of all material and reasonably available information (i.e.,
they did not act on an informed basis); (2) acted in bad
faith, with a conflict of interest or disloyalty; or (3) did
not honestly believe that they were acting in the best
interest of the Cooperative.111
The Fourth Circuit determined that the FDIC had presented
adequate evidence to rebut the presumption that the officers acted on an
informed basis.112 Notably, in reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit
relied almost exclusively on the affidavit of the FDIC’s expert witness,
Brian Kelley.113 Kelley’s affidavit stated that, in his opinion, “the officers
did not act in accordance with generally accepted banking practices.”114
More specifically, Kelley stated that the defendants had “often approved
loans over the telephone, without first examining relevant documents”
and that “[the defendants] often did not receive the loan documents until
after the phone calls, and sometimes not until after the loans had already

110. Id. at 310. While the court characterized its analysis as different “application,” the
effect of applying the BJR in such a way that allows its initial presumption to be rebutted by
evidence that due care was lacking ultimately amounts to a different interpretation of the rule
(i.e., what is sufficient to rebut the BJR’s initial presumption of due care). Id.
111. Id. at 313. Importantly, no cases are cited in support of this articulation of how the
BJR’s initial presumption can be rebutted. Id. The court appeared to simply make a logical
deduction to arrive at this conclusion. See id. (concluding this articulation of the rule to be
the proper statement of law without citing to any authority supporting such an understanding,
and, instead, premising its articulation on an observation concerning “the structure of the
business judgment rule”).
112. Id. at 313–14.
113. Id. The Fourth Circuit described Kelley as an independent banking consultant and
former “senior bank executive, lender, and attorney at both regional and large commercial
banks.” Id. at 313 (internal quotation marks omitted).
114. Id. at 313.
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been funded.”115 The Fourth Circuit pointed to Kelley’s observation that
“[Cooperative’s] review process . . . did not comport with his
understanding of officer and director duties . . . [and] that [the defendants]
had failed to address warnings and deficiencies in the Bank’s examination
reports” as further evidence that the defendants’ duty of care had not been
met.116 While the court acknowledged that Cooperative had been
awarded “2” ratings from regulators, it emphasized Kelley’s observations
that Cooperative had failed to correct areas of concern identified in the
same examination reports.117 As a result, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the FDIC had presented sufficient evidence to rebut the BJR’s
presumption of due care and vacated the district court’s award of
summary judgment to officers on the claims of negligence and breach of
fiduciary duties.118
Looking forward, the only remaining issues to be decided by the
district court on remand are whether the officer defendants’ actions
constituted a breach of their fiduciary duties, and, relatedly, whether such
actions constituted ordinary negligence.119 How the case is ultimately
resolved, however, is subordinate to how the case was decided by the
Fourth Circuit. In that respect, the damage may have already been done.
The subsequent discussion elaborates on the practical effects of the
Fourth Circuit’s application of the BJR, and examines corollary issues
that should be considered in light of the decision.
IV. ANALYSIS OF NOTABLE ISSUES DECIDED IN RIPPY
As evinced by the geographical breadth of the amicus briefs
submitted on behalf of the defendants, although Rippy is a federal case

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 313–14. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit held that Kelley’s affidavit was also
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants’ reliance
on other officials and employees was “reasonable” within the meaning of section 55-8-30(b).
Id. at 316. The court, therefore, denied the remaining officer defendants’ alternative ground
for summary judgment. Id. On the FDIC’s gross negligence claims, the Fourth Circuit sided
with the defendants’ contention that a showing of intentional wrongdoing is necessary to
sustain a claim of gross negligence. Id. at 314. Accordingly, because the FDIC could not
present any evidence of intentional wrongdoing by any of the defendants, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s award of summary judgment on all gross negligence claims. Id.
at 315.
119. Id. at 314.
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applying North Carolina law, it will have significant persuasive value in
North Carolina courts as well as federal courts located in states with
similar BJRs.120 Consequently, the Fourth Circuit’s application of the
BJR and its treatment of Cooperative’s exculpatory provision should be
of considerable interest to the banking industry at large.121
A.

How the Fourth Circuit Applied the BJR and the Potentially
Adverse Implications

The strikingly different analyses of the BJR by the Fourth Circuit
and district court highlight the ambiguity surrounding proper application
of North Carolina’s BJR, particularly as it relates to the duty of care.122
While the Fourth Circuit’s discussion of the BJR basically tracked the
district court’s explanation, the Fourth Circuit’s application of the rule
diverged when it declared that the BJR’s initial presumption could be
rebutted by a showing that the defendants “did not avail themselves of all
material and reasonably available information (i.e., they did not act on an
informed basis).”123 In contrast to the district court’s holding that the
BJR’s initial presumption could only be rebutted by a showing of activity
amounting to gross negligence, the Fourth Circuit’s implicit holding that
the BJR’s initial presumption could be rebutted by evidence suggesting
that due care was not exercised demonstrates how vastly different
standards of liability can be derived from different answers to the
question of what constitutes adequate rebuttal evidence.124
The Fourth Circuit’s determination that the FDIC adduced
sufficient evidence to rebut the BJR’s initial presumption—under the
particular facts of the case—both accentuates and amplifies the
importance of how courts answer this question.125 Given the fact120. See LaCroix, Fourth Circuit, supra note 6 (noting that the Fourth Circuit’s decision
“ha[s] been very closely watched”).
121. Id.
122. Compare Willetts II, 48 F. Supp. 3d 844 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (holding that the FDIC
had presented insufficient evidence to rebut the initial presumption of the business judgment
rule), with Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313–14 (holding that the FDIC had presented sufficient
evidence to rebut the initial presumption).
123. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313.
124. Compare Willetts II, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 849–50 (establishing gross negligence as the
standard of liability for D&Os), with Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313 (establishing ordinary negligence
as the standard of liability for D&Os).
125. See LaCroix, Fourth Circuit, supra note 6 (discussing the potential issues
surrounding the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on the FDIC’s expert’s affidavit).
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intensive nature of failed bank litigation, and bank litigation generally,
the Fourth Circuit’s nearly exclusive reliance on the FDIC’s expert’s
affidavit invites the question of whether similarly critical affidavits, based
entirely on opinion, could be sufficient to defeat the BJR in other bank
failure cases.126 If so, the initial presumption established by the BJR
would be made significantly more surmountable, as every bank will have
practices that a hired expert can point to as “not [being] in accordance
with generally accepted banking practices.”127 Consequently, not only
does the precedent that the BJR’s initial presumption of due care can be
rebutted with a showing of a lack of due care expose D&Os to liability
for ordinary negligence, it effectively renders the BJR worthless if the
initial presumption can be rebutted by one expert’s opinion that a bank
could have operated more soundly.128
Demonstrating the importance of the BJR and the significant
policy interests implicated by the protection it affords are the fifty-nine
amicus briefs offered in support of the defendants in Rippy and the
arguments contained therein.129 As evidenced by Willetts I, because of
the fact-intensive nature of bank litigation, the BJR is generally
insufficient to dispose of such litigation on a motion to dismiss, even
where there may not be a strong case against a director or officer
defendant.130 Therefore, the only viable opportunity D&Os have to
dispose of a case before trial is at the summary judgment stage.131 If
defendants do not prevail at the summary judgment stage, “they face a
Hobson’s choice of settling (often at significant personal expense) or
litigating (with ruinous amounts of potential liability in the balance).”132
With such a degree of potential personal liability at stake, it is
unsurprising that, even where claims against D&Os are weak, the vast

126. Id. In the defendant’s Reply Brief they noted language from an unpublished opinion
to the effect that not only should the court not substitute its own judgment for that of the
board, but that it should not substitute the Plaintiff’s expert opinion for that of the board.
Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 73, at 6.
127. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313; see LaCroix, Fourth Circuit, supra note 6 (expressing that
the FDIC will almost always be able to hire experts who will provide similar criticisms to
what was presented in Rippy).
128. LaCroix, Fourth Circuit, supra note 6.
129. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 301–02.
130. Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States at 10,
Rippy, 799 F.3d 301 (No. 14-2078).
131. Id. at 11.
132. Id.

2016]

FDIC V. RIPPY

209

majority are settled.133 Of the thirty-four FDIC lawsuits that occurred in
the wake of the 2008 financial crisis that were resolved by the end of
2014, thirty-three settled, with only one going to trial.134 Thus, weaker
application of the BJR at the summary judgment stage coupled with the
pressure that D&Os feel to settle to avoid going to trial effectively
deprives them of all of its protection.135
Relatedly, because the BJR seeks to prevent judicial secondguessing, it follows that any softening of the rule is likely to spur
additional meritless litigation, the cost of which would presumably be
passed on to consumers.136 Such an undesirable effect would also be
magnified by the Fourth Circuit’s holding that the FDIC’s expert’s
opinion was sufficient to rebut the BJR’s initial presumption.137 If a hired
expert’s opinion is sufficient to rebut the initial presumption at the
summary judgment stage, a litigious individual, or group of individuals,
are likely to produce a similarly disparaging affidavit in hopes of putting
the defendants in a situation where settling is the path of least
resistance.138 At the very least, such a tempering of the BJR creates
significant uncertainty as to the extent of protection it provides D&Os,
which may further encourage the settlement of even baseless claims.139
Undoubtedly, any state whose BJR requires D&Os to vindicate their
business judgments through costly litigation will deter qualified and
talented D&Os from seeking or taking leadership positions there.140 As
a result, such a state is likely to experience adverse effects on the

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Brief of Amicus Curiae for the American Bankers Association and State Banking
Associations at 9–10, FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy (2015) (No. 14-2078).
137. See LaCroix, Fourth Circuit, supra note 6 (discussing the ease with which the FDIC
can procure similar affidavits thereby lessening the protection available to D&Os under the
BJR).
138. See id. (explaining the problems of attributing such weight to expert witness
affidavits, particularly in light of their widespread availability); Brief of Amicus Curiae for
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, supra note 130, at 11–12 (highlighting the
incredibly high settlement rate in FDIC lawsuits).
139. Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, supra
note 130, at 12–13 (emphasizing how uncertainty can be leveraged to force settlement in
largely meritless cases).
140. See 3A FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 1037, Westlaw (database updated Sep. 2015)
(“[B]usiness is inherently risky and the quality of a business decision cannot always be judged
by the immediate results; therefore, personal liability for a decision that produces bad results
would make it difficult to secure the services of able and experienced corporate directors.”).
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prosperity of its banks and the many sectors of society that rely on their
well-being.141
Perhaps more importantly, not only would such a softening of the
BJR affect the behavior of those considering D&O opportunities, the
actions of those already holding such positions would also be affected.142
D&Os fearful of incurring personal liability might avoid taking
potentially beneficial risks they might otherwise take but for that fear.143
As was emphasized by the district court, risk-taking is essential to the
vitality of banks.144 Because banks are so inextricably tied to the
communities in which they reside, an influx of risk-averse D&Os might
stifle growth in the many communities that rely on their banks to extend
credit to those looking to start, fund, or expand business.145 Such a barrier
to capital could potentially snowball into reduced revenue, fewer job
opportunities, and consequently, diminished prosperity in the entire
community.146 Furthermore, a bank’s failure to serve the fundamental
needs of its community could potentially result in a decrease in market
share, increased regulatory criticism, and the subsequent possibility of
acquisition by larger, more aggressive, and less consumer-friendly
banks.147 In light of the apparent erosion of D&O protection afforded by
the state, banks should look to other avenues of protection to offset the
increased exposure of D&Os to personal liability.

141. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for the American Bankers Association and State Banking
Associations, supra note 136, at 7 (“If corporate value is to be enhanced, the courts must not
discourage qualified and capable people from serving as directors and taking risks.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Cf. Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States, supra note 131, at 19–20 (explaining the inextricable relationship between the
welfare of community banks and that of their surrounding communities, specifically in the
lending context).
142. Id. at 4.
143. See Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States,
supra note 130 at 18 (“Hindsight review of business decisions destroys ‘[t]he entire advantage
of the risk-taking, innovative, wealth-creating engine that is the . . . corporation . . . with
disastrous results for shareholders and society alike.’ ”) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005)).
144. Willetts II, 48 F. Supp. 3d 844, 851 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (“[C]orporations are expected
to take risks and their directors and officers are entitled to protection from the business
judgment rule when those risks turn out poorly.”)
145. Brief of Amicus Curiae for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, supra
note 130, at 19.
146. See id. (noting the FDIC’s own study on the importance of community banks
extending credit to individuals and organizations in their communities).
147. Id. at 20.
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Exculpatory Clauses in North Carolina and the Potential Effects
of Limiting Individual Liability

The Fourth Circuit’s affirmance that exculpatory provisions will
protect directors from ordinary negligence claims unless they “ ‘knew or
believed [that their acts or omissions] were clearly in conflict’ with the
Bank’s best interests” establishes a gross negligence standard that the
court implicitly rejected in its application of the BJR.148 For something
to be clearly in conflict, a director has to act in a manner that amounts to
bad faith; “[a]ctions that might have been harmful or decisions that could
have been better made” are insufficient.149 Therefore, a director protected
by an exculpatory clause will be insulated from any harm that results from
a decision, even if the director made a decision with less information than
an “ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under similar
circumstances.”150 In effect, exculpatory provisions preclude monetary
damages stemming from a breach of the duty of care.151 Accordingly,
any potential softening of the BJR can be offset for directors by including
an exculpatory provision in a bank’s articles of incorporation.152
For bank officers, the Fourth Circuit’s discussion of exculpatory
clauses might also provide a glimmer of hope for the future.
Interestingly, in its analysis, the Fourth Circuit proclaimed: “The Bank’s
exculpatory provision does not cover Bank Officers.”153 This seemingly
innocuous sentence presents a finding of fact, rather than a conclusion of
law, as one would expect if exculpatory clauses were categorically
prohibited from protecting officers.154 Assuming the Fourth Circuit’s
148. FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 312 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (2015)).
149. Id. at 312–13.
150. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 18.12; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-8-30(a)(2), 55-8-42(a)(2)
(2015).
151. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 18.12.
152. See, e.g., Marc I. Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919,
920 (1989) (discussing the effect of exculpatory provisions on the duty of care after Van
Gorkom). Of further benefit to those covered by exculpatory provisions, North Carolina
allows exculpation of liability stemming from “third-party actions as well as direct or
derivative corporate actions.” ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 18.12.
153. Rippy, 799 F.3d at 313 (capitalization in original).
154. 28 STRONG’S N.C. INDEX 4TH, Trial § 539 (2007) (“ ‘Findings of fact’ are statements
of what happened in space and time. A pronouncement by the trial court which does not
require the employment of legal principles will be treated as a ‘finding of fact,’ regardless of
how it is denominated in the court’s order.”) (quoting Duvenant v. Duvenant, 142 N.C. App.
169, 173 (2001)).
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opinion was written with the care and deliberation one expects to find in
a Federal Court of Appeals opinion, it may suggest that the exclusion of
officers from protection under Cooperative’s exculpatory provision was
simply because they were not covered by the provision in this instance.155
Thus, the Fourth Circuit seems to leave open, or at least deliberately not
address, the question of whether the absence of express authorization of
the use of exculpatory provisions by officers in section 55-2-02(b)(3)
necessarily equates to a prohibition on such use.156
1. Possible Reasons for the Limitation of Exculpatory Provisions to
Directors
In light of the Fourth Circuit’s apparent narrowing of the BJR and
the corresponding rise in value of exculpatory provisions, the disparity in
the law’s treatment of D&Os demands further exploration.157 As
previously discussed, North Carolina law does not currently extend the
use of exculpatory clauses to officers.158 In fact, only five states currently
allow exculpatory provisions to protect officers from liability. 159 The
reasons for the disparity in the protection available to directors and
officers are unclear and likely manifold.160
155. See Matter of Wills of Jacobs, 91 N.C. App. 138, 144 (1988) (“Rule 52 of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the trial court make specific findings of fact
and conclusions of law so that the appellate courts may determine whether the trial court has
correctly applied the law to the facts.”)
156. See Savage v. Zelent, 777 S.E.2d 801, 804 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) (expressing the
interpretational rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius – “expression of one thing is the
exclusion of the other”).
157. See generally Dennis R. Honabach, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Managerial Liability and
Exculpatory Clauses–A Proposal to Fill the Gap of the Missing Officer Protection, 45
WASHBURN L.J. 307 (2006) (providing possible explanations for this disparity in treatment,
discussing why it is important, and arguing that the gap needs to be filled).
158. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (2015) (authorizing use of a “provision limiting
or eliminating the personal liability of any director”) (emphasis added).
159. See Honabach, supra note 157, at 318 n.82 (listing Louisiana, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Virginia, Nevada, and Utah as the states authorizing officers the use
of exculpatory provisions). Since publication, however, Nevada raised its standard of liability
to gross negligence, thus foreclosing the need for such a provision. See NEV. REV. STAT.
§78.138(7) (2015) (providing that officers will be personally liable for a breach of duty when
“[t]he breach of those duties involved intentional misconduct, fraud or a knowing violation of
law”). Utah has since shifted the other direction, and no longer allows for exculpation of
officers. UTAH CODE ANN. §16-10a-841 (West 2015) (providing, without mention of
applicability to officers, that directors may limit personal liability).
160. See Honabach, supra note 157, at 326–28 (detailing the different ways states handle
officer liability and the relevant policy considerations).
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One historical possibility is that the distinction emerged as a
result of the factual background of the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom,161 in which a group of directors were
found personally liable for their failure to exercise due care in
recommending a failed merger.162 Prior to Van Gorkom, it was
practically inconceivable that directors could be found personally liable
for breaching their duty of care.163 In response to the perceived expansion
of personal liability for directors, the business-minded Delaware
legislature took immediate action to provide additional measures of
protection.164 One of these measures included the implementation of a
statute authorizing Delaware corporations to protect directors from
incurring personal liability for actions taken pursuant to their directorial
roles.165 The specific statutory provisions added by Delaware’s General
Assembly were crafted by the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware
Bar Association.166 Gilchrist Sparks, the Chairman of the Corporation
Law Section, specifically noted that the legislation was largely a reaction
to the Van Gorkom decision.167 Such being the case, the provisions only
intended to compensate for the perceived expansion of directorial
liability.168
Although the extent to which exculpatory provisions offered
greater protection to directors was subject to much speculation and
debate, many states soon followed suit, implementing their own statutes
authorizing the exculpation of corporate directors.169 When other states
took steps to adopt similar provisions, many of them, including North

161. Honabach, supra note 157, at 328.
162. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A. 2d 858, 872–81 (1985) (explaining how directors were

found to have breached their duty of care).
163. See Steinberg, supra note 152, at 919–20 (“Shocked at the Delaware court’s
‘chutzpah’ in imposing liability where no self-dealing or other breach of the duty of loyalty
existed, corporate fiduciaries and their counsel clamored for action.”).
164. Honabach, supra note 157, at 311–12.
165. Id.
166. Thomas C. Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors’ Liability: Delaware’s Section
102(b)(7) and the Erosion of the Directors’ Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 247 n.32
(1987).
167. See id. at 252 n.63 (stating that directors’ concerns “were heightened by highly
publicized lawsuits involving potentially ruinous recoveries”).
168. See Honabach, supra note 157, at 307 (contending that “the explanation for the
exclusion of officers is more an accident of history than a product of tight legal analysis”).
169. Id. at 313.
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Carolina,170 used language that resembled the language in Delaware’s
statute.171 Consequently, the disparity in protection available to directors
and officers may be at least partly attributable to the factual context from
which exculpatory provisions emerged.172
However, such a viewpoint seems to necessitate a resounding
lack of faith in lawmakers’ abilities to do more than transcribe the statute
of another state. To this end, many practical considerations exist that
support limiting the use of exculpatory provisions to directors.173 Some
commentators suggest that different treatment of D&Os may be
warranted on the ground that officers have greater accessibility to
corporate information and a much higher degree of day-to-day
involvement, so they are in a better position to mitigate their own
liability.174 Citing the premise that liability should be commensurate with
an individual’s level of involvement, other commentators point to the
general disparity in compensation between directors and officers to
justify differing levels of protection.175 Such a perspective conceives
exculpatory provisions as an additional form of compensation, which can
be used to attract the best and brightest directors in the same way that
monetary compensation is used to attract the best and brightest officers.176
Whatever the reason for the disparity in protection available to
D&Os, exculpatory provisions in North Carolina will be unlikely to
protect officers until the General Assembly expressly adjusts the statute
to do so, or until North Carolina courts begin interpreting the statute’s
express authorization of protection of directors as not precluding
application to officers.177 However, no North Carolina cases have
170. Steinberg, supra note 152, at 920 n.12.
171. Id. at 920–21.
172. See Honabach, supra note 157, at 328 (offering the possibility that “the reason most

exculpatory provisions apply only to a director might well be explained more easily as a
historical artifact, a response to Van Gorkom”).
173. See id. at 327–29 (discussing the robust legal commentary “analyz[ing] both the
existing law and its desirability” that has emerged in the wake of Enron and the subsequent
corporate responsibility movement).
174. A. Gilchrist Sparks, III, & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of NonDirector Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 219–20 (1992).
175. Id. at 219.
176. See Mae Kuykendall, Symmetry and Dissonance in Corporate Law: Perfecting the
Exoneration of Directors, Corrupting Indemnification and Straining the Framework of
Corporate Law, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443, 535–36 (1998) (discussing indemnification
as a form of compensation, but the underlying rationale still applies to exculpation).
177. See Honabach, supra note 157, at 327 (noting that resolution of this issue is first in
the hands of the state legislature and then in the hands of the courts).
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discussed the interpretation of section 55-2-02(b)(3), and those courts
applying the provision have unanimously interpreted it as limiting
potential liability only for directors.178
2. Potential Issues Related to the Use of Exculpatory Provisions
While the availability and use of exculpatory provisions for
directors became essentially ubiquitous following Van Gorkom, the
extent of their use should not be taken to imply that they do not present
their own problems.179 The widespread adoption of exculpatory
provisions, much like any limitation on D&O liability, has been criticized
as providing directors with an invincibility cloak under which they can
act with impunity.180 The deterrent effect intended by the legislature’s
prescription of standards of conduct for directors is substantially
weakened by removing the ultimate check on individual actions: selfinterest.181 With potential adverse consequences removed from the
picture, the caution that emanates from fear of liability may be similarly
vacated.182 Because the legislature prohibited certain conduct precisely
because of its potentially detrimental effect on the relevant interests at
stake, those expansive interests are threatened where the prescribed
standard of conduct can be so easily contravened.183
More specifically, as precisely demonstrated by Rippy,
exculpatory provisions effectively serve to protect directors from liability
stemming from a breach of their duty of care.184 Because a primary aspect
of the duty of care is the requirement that directors act on an informed

178. See ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 18.12 (discussing exculpatory clauses in North
Carolina generally, and specifically noting that they may only be used to protect directors
from potential liability).
179. See Lloyd L. Drury, III, What’s the Cost of A Free Pass? A Call for the Reassessment
of Statutes that Allow for the Elimination of Personal Liability for Directors, 9
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 99, 114–22 (2007) (providing a detailed discussion of the
potentially negative impact that exculpatory provisions can have on companies who make use
of them).
180. Id. at 114–16.
181. Id. at 114.
182. Id.
183. See FDIC ex rel. Coop. Bank v. Rippy, 799 F.3d 301, 312 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining
how exculpatory clauses can protect directors from liability arising from conduct that fails to
meet the prescribed statutory standards); see also Steinberg, supra note 152, at 928–29
(explaining the potential effect of exculpatory provisions on Delaware’s duty of care).
184. Steinberg, supra note 152, at 919–20.
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basis, limiting protection of a director’s duty of care may translate into
better business decisions, ultimately benefitting the entire corporation.185
Commentators have suggested that where directors are immune to
liability from their duty of care and thus face less pressure to act with the
deliberation and circumspection required by it, they are more likely to
violate other duties.186 A decreased obligation to exercise care and
deliberation in decision-making may engender a mentality that might not
serve the best interests of the corporation as a whole, while still not being
contrary to the corporation’s best interests.187 Such behavior may begin
as benign shortcuts, but without the threat of possible repercussions, it
may devolve into increasingly unsound and high-risk practices putting
the welfare of the entire corporation in jeopardy. 188 Furthermore, the
additional protection offered by exculpatory provisions weakens the
viability of litigation as a means of redressing violations of prescribed
standards of conduct.189 Thus, by rendering an important check on
behavior less effective, the ability of shareholders and other third parties
to maintain an even playing field may be threatened.190
A 1989 study by Michael Bradley and Cindy Schipani provides
empirical support for the conceptual argument that limiting the potential
personal liability of directors may adversely affect the corporation as a
whole.191 The study, performed in Delaware during the post-Van Gorkom
surge in the use of exculpatory provisions, indicated that the mere
existence of exculpatory provisions as a mechanism for limiting director
liability negatively impacted shareholders of Delaware corporations.192

185. Drury, supra note 179, at 114–115.
186. Id.
187. Cf. id. at 115 (discussing how greater pressure on a director or officer to ensure that

they are informed in their decision-making may foster better business practices across the
board, which will, in-turn, benefit the company as a whole).
188. See id. (“The idea is that the procedural good of informing oneself is not simply an
intrinsic good, but is instrumental in achieving other desirable ends such as being aware of
conflicts and making substantive decisions that are more likely to be of the greatest benefit to
shareholders.”).
189. See Kuykendall, supra note 176, at 469–70 (“Exculpation statutes, simply by
enactment, eliminate large segments of the financial liability of directors in public
corporations. In doing so, they create a dissonance between substantive corporate law, which
remains intact despite the removal of financial accountability, and the remedial
substructure.”).
190. Id.
191. Drury, supra note 179, at 118.
192. Id.; See also Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of
Care Standard in Corporate Governance, 75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 47–70 (1989) (discussing the
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The study observed a significant decrease in the value of Delaware
corporations following the availability of exculpatory provisions.193 The
natural inference was that the market viewed potential individual liability
as an effective restraint on directorial action, and more broadly, that
personal liability functions as an important tool in promoting sound
corporate governance practices.194 Accordingly, while exculpatory
provisions may be necessary to attract the most desirable directors
possible, their use should be considered in light of some of the
countervailing problems they present.195
V. CONCLUSION
While it might be hyperbolic to say that the Fourth Circuit’s
holding in Rippy drastically alters the landscape of D&O liability in the
banking industry, it should be disconcerting to many that the Fourth
Circuit applied the BJR with the weakest force it possibly could have
given the existing body of case law. Particularly, given the fact-intensive
nature of bank litigation, the Fourth Circuit’s holding that a lack of due
care is sufficient to rebut the BJR dilutes the protection it provides to an
extent that renders it unhelpful at best.196 As a consequence of being
unable to dispose of such onerous litigation at the summary judgment
stage, the banking industry in North Carolina will likely experience
harmful, derivative effects that will make serving community needs that
much more difficult.197
Until it can be ascertained whether the Fourth Circuit’s
application of the BJR in North Carolina will serve as a new guiding light
results of an empirical study on the immediate effect of exculpatory provisions on the value
of Delaware corporations following Van Gorkom).
193. Drury, supra note 179, at 118; Bradley & Schipani, supra note 192, at 60–64
(comparing the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns in the twenty-one trading
days prior to the Van Gorkom decision and the twenty-two trading days after the Van-Gorkom
decision).
194. Id.; Bradley & Schipani, supra note 192, at 61 (finding this conclusion to be
“consistent with the view that the new regime established by section 102(b)(7) allows
corporate managers greater latitude in managing their firms, which in turn increases the
agency costs of the corporate form and reduces the value of the equity claims of these firms”).
195. Drury, supra note 179, at 113.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 132–38.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 139–50 (discussing how the Fourth Circuit’s
application of the BJR, if applied consistently, would encourage frivolous litigation, make it
difficult to attract and retain quality D&Os, and decrease the availability of credit in
communities that rely on their local banks.)
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for the courts, the apparent waning of the protection afforded by the BJR
will conversely magnify the value of the numerous other avenues of
protection banks can provide their D&Os.198 In view of the apparent
erosion of the protection offered by the BJR, banks should reexamine
their articles of incorporation to determine whether additional
mechanisms of protection would serve their best interest. As discussed,
this might include the adoption of exculpatory provisions, which, if used
to the fullest extent of their legal force, will protect bank directors from
personal liability arising from any conduct that does not amount to gross
negligence.199 Regardless of the specific means of protection, banks
should be aware of the potentially adverse effects that limiting individual
liability may have on the organization as a whole.200
Rather than take the “wait and see approach,” banks should take
immediate action to put their D&Os in positions they feel will enable
them to make decisions that will most effectively serve the interests of
the bank.200201 As one of America’s foremost innovators once observed,
“[w]hen one door closes, another opens; but we often look so long and so
regretfully upon the closed door that we do not see the one which has
opened for us.”201202 The banking industry would do well not to forget
this advice anytime soon.
CORY A. MCKENNA

198. See Honabach, supra note 157, at 307 (discussing the demand for increased director
protection following a court decision perceived as expanding potential liability).
199. See supra Part IV.B. (discussing the practical effect of exculpatory provisions on
director conduct as raising the standard of liability to gross negligence and identifying
additional consequences to consider before implementation). Other measures banks can take
to limit both D&O liability include indemnification of a director of officer for reasonable costs
incurred during the litigation process upon a vote of the board, ROBINSON, supra note 9, at §
18.04, and purchasing liability insurance to protect D&Os for personal liability up to a certain
amount. ROBINSON, supra note 9, at § 18.10. For a more thorough discussion of ways to limit
D&O liability, see Seth Van Aalten, D&O Insurance in the Age of Enron: Protecting Officers
and Directors in Corporate Bankruptcies, 22 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 457 (2003).
200
See supra Part IV.B.ii.
201
See WYRICK ROBBINS YATES & PONTON LLP, CLIENT ALERT: SCOPE OF THE FIDUCIARY
DUTY
OF
CARE
FOR
DIRECTORS
AND
OFFICERS
(2015),
http://www.wyrick.com/documents/newsPdfs/ClientAlertFiduciaryDuties.pdf (urging clients
to reexamine their articles of incorporation following the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Rippy).
202
Alexander Graham Bell (date unknown).

